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25 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Committee Papers

1. Attached are the two papers we discussed at lunch.
2. The Vance (McNaughton) paper's argument is rooted in a too comfortable analysis of the military threat which obscures the critical need for more troops to match current North Vietnamese inputs.
3. We (VAS) believe nine additional army-sized maneuver battalion equivalents (800 men each) are needed urgently in I Corps to meet the current and probable near-term future threat there. We believe six army maneuver battalion equivalents are needed in II Corps and three in III Corps to replace the troops already stripped from II and III Corps to meet the I Corps threat.
4. I was rightly uncomfortable about that NVA regiment figure and regret that I misinformed you. An NVA regiment comprises about 2,000 men on the average (the number varies widely with the type). Five regiments is the starch out of 10,000 men.
5. Rostow's counter-argument is essentially sound. He confuses the theater (DMZ) with the Communist objective (dispersion of allied forces and loss of allied offensive capabilities). He also goes only part of the way (but in the right direction) in defining the prime requirement for pacification security. Not only must we harry the VC provincial battalions into the ground, we must do the same with their village companies and district platoons. He is also wrong in believing no reserve call-up is needed now.

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